We continue to see growing patient demand for ZEVASKYN, the first and only autologous cell-based gene therapy for the treatment of adults and pediatric patients with recessive dystrophic epidermolysis bullosa or RDEB. We recognize that in this patient-driven market, providing a smooth journey is the most effective way to catalyze the organic demand needed to scale ZEVASKYN in 2026 and beyond. Starting this year, we have deployed a field team that has been engaging with community physicians and the number of identified eligible ZEVASKYN patients has now grown to more than 100. While demand continues to grow, the speed at which identified patients receive ZEVASKYN treatment has significantly varied during these initial months of launch, but the momentum is picking up.

Total revenue for the year ending December 31st, 2025, was $5.8 million. Total revenue includes $3.4 million in license and other revenues and $2.4 million in net product revenue. As more patients are treated, we expect our gross margins to increase significantly with better economies of scale related to production costs. Selling, general, and administrative, or SG&A, expenses for 2025 were $65 million, an increase of $35.1 million over 2024.

This increase primarily reflects Abeona's commercial transition following the April 2025 FDA approval of ZEVASKYN. Just if you can comment on, based on the demand ramp that you're seeing, how confident are you in achieving profitability first half this year? I'm just curious if you're finding that it might be logistically easier to activate more of these centers as opposed to trying to increase the band of referrals. This is part of when you say R&D, we're always thinking about pipeline.

What went well
  • Abeona treated its first commercial ZEVASKYN patient in December 2025 - the launch's first proof of concept - and reported its first-ever product revenue.
  • Full-year 2025 total revenue was $5.8 million, comprising $3.4 million of license and other revenue (largely a $3 million Q4 clinical milestone under the Rett syndrome sublicense with Taysha Gene Therapies) and $2.4 million of net product revenue from the first ZEVASKYN treatment.
  • The May 2025 sale of the rare pediatric disease priority review voucher produced a $152.4 million gain on sale, driving full-year net income of $71.2 million ($1.01 diluted EPS) versus a $63.7 million net loss ($1.55 loss per share) in 2024.
  • Demand scaled: identified eligible patients across QTCs and community physicians grew to more than 100 (from ~50), with no patient attrition and no payer denials to date.
  • The QTC network reached four activated centers (adding UTMB at Galveston, Texas alongside Lurie, Stanford and Children's Hospital Colorado), with five more in onboarding and a goal of at least seven active by the end of 2026.
  • Manufacturing was running at six runs per month with a clear path to 10 per month by the second half of 2026, and the sterility-assay issue was resolved after productive FDA dialogue, with next-generation rapid sterility testing in development.
  • Market access held firm - all major commercial payers with published policies (~80% of commercial lives), Medicaid coverage across all states, and the CMS J-code effective January 1, 2026 - and payers were not blocking potential retreatment.
What went wrong
  • Commercial output was still tiny: only one patient was treated in the reported quarter (two treated in total by the call date), so net product revenue was just $2.4 million for the full year.
  • The first treated patient was a Medicaid patient, carrying a higher government rebate, so average net revenue per patient was expected to normalize higher only as commercial patients enter the mix.
  • SG&A ballooned to $65 million for 2025, up $35.1 million, on the commercial transition (including $18.6 million of personnel and stock-based compensation and $2.3 million of direct commercialization costs).
  • Cost of sales of $1.5 million included the cost of the August production batch that could not be released due to the FDA-mandated rapid sterility assay issue.
  • The speed from patient identification to treatment remained long and highly variable - roughly four to five months (including ~25 days of manufacturing) - and only the first two QTCs had treated or biopsied patients so far; the other two were still moving patients through set-up.
  • Cash and investments declined to $191.4 million at year-end 2025, and the company remained pre-profitability at the corporate level.

Guidance Changes

MetricPeriodCurrent guidance
Company-wide profitability1H 2026Reaffirmed a good chance of profitability in the first half of 2026; break-even north of three patients per month (~$3.5M+ per month; ~$100M annual burn)
Active QTCsEnd of 2026Goal of at least seven active QTCs by end of 2026 (four active, five in onboarding; some may spill into 2027)
Manufacturing capacity2H 2026Running at six runs per month, ramping to about 10 per month by the second half of 2026
Steady-state cadence2026Sites indicate one-to-two patients per month each; targeting three consecutive months of consistent delivery by mid-year
R&D drivers2026+Main R&D drivers are the FDA post-approval registry study and pipeline development; preclinical spend kept minimal in 2026
Gross margin2026Expected to increase significantly with scale and better production economics as more patients are treated

Performance Breakdown

MetricYoYNote
Total revenue (FY2025) $5.8M $3.4M license/other (incl. a $3M Q4 Taysha/Rett milestone) plus $2.4M net product revenue from the first ZEVASKYN treatment.
Net income (FY2025) $71.2M vs -$63.7M Driven by the $152.4M gain on the May 2025 PRV sale.
Diluted EPS (FY2025) $1.01 vs -$1.55 PRV gain versus a prior-year loss.
R&D expense (FY2025) $26.8M vs $34.4M Post-approval capitalization of production costs into inventory and engineering runs no longer classified as R&D.
SG&A expense (FY2025) $65.0M vs $29.9M Commercial transition: $18.6M personnel/stock-based comp, $2.3M direct commercialization, plus reclassified engineering/training costs.
Cost of sales (FY2025) $1.5M First December treatment plus the cost of the unreleased August production batch.
Cash and investments $191.4M (YE2025) Down from mid-year as the PRV proceeds fund the launch.

Earnings Call Themes & Trends

TopicPrevious mentionCurrent periodTrend
From approval to first revenuePre-revenueFirst patient treated December 2025; 2025 delivered first commercial proof of concept, with 2026 framed as scaling the commercial blueprint.—
QTC onboarding3 centersFour activated (added UTMB Galveston); several-month onboarding requires multidisciplinary team, MSA, trade policy, training and IRB registry; goal of 7 active by end-2026.—
Speed to treatment~3-4 monthsNow ~4-5 months and highly variable; expected to shorten as sites gain repetition and payer policies are pre-published.—
Payer mix / economics-First patient was Medicaid (higher rebate); average net revenue expected to rise as commercial patients enter; gross margins to improve with scale; break-even ~3 patients/month.—
ManufacturingAssay issueResolved after FDA dialogue; running six runs/month, ramping to ~10 by 2H 2026; next-gen rapid sterility test in development to cut false-positive risk.—
Retreatment-Some patients with large body-surface wounds will need a second ZEVASKYN course; no payer exclusions on retreatment observed so far.—

Q&A Summary

H.C. Wainwright asked about the cadence of QTC activations and 2026 R&D drivers.
Management is working with five additional centers (one imminent), targeting seven active by year-end; R&D will be driven mainly by the FDA post-approval registry study and pipeline, with preclinical spend kept minimal in 2026.
Jefferies asked about per-QTC patient capacity and time from start form to treatment.
Sites indicate one-to-two patients per month (some up to three); the first patients took about four-to-five months (including ~25 days manufacturing), expected to shorten with experience.
Analysts asked how confident management is in first-half-2026 profitability.
Management sees a good chance, noting break-even north of three patients per month (~$3.5M+/month against ~$100M annual burn), with the main variables being third/fourth-site ramp and new-site onboarding speed.
Stifel asked whether payers peg prior-authorization to trial criteria or the label.
A mix - some peg to inclusion/exclusion criteria, others (e.g., UnitedHealthcare and several Medicaid states) to the broader label; letters of medical necessity have overturned age and other restrictions, and criteria have not ultimately prevented reimbursement.
Oppenheimer asked whether the sterility issue is behind them and about capacity.
The CTO said FDA dialogue was productive and the resolution is durable; the plant runs six patients/month, on track to 10/month through the year, and feasibility work reduced the false-positive probability by at least an order of magnitude.

More on Abeona Therapeutics Inc.

Reported 2026-03-17 · figures from the Abeona Therapeutics Inc. Q4 2025 earnings call.

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